

Abstracts

Julia Mosquera: Corrective Justice and Non-Human Animals

While duties of corrective justice in the case of harms to human beings are widely accepted, there is almost non-existing discussion on whether these duties should be extended to non-human animals, even though animals are also wronged by our actions, and sometimes even to a greater extent.

Very few maintain that we owe nothing to non-human animals, especially to those in need. Many agree that we have at least *some* duties of justice to non-human animals, for example, of distributive justice (based on priority (see Regan, 1984; Holtug, 2007), equality (see Horta, 2016; Persson and Vallentyne, 2005), or sufficiency (Crisp)). In this paper I explore how corrective justice can be extended to non-human animals. The paper investigates why certain normative attitudes are not necessary in order to count as a claimant of corrective justice. I suggest which responses can count as fitting when it comes to discharging duties of corrective justice to non-human animals. I also discuss who should be understood as the candidate for having claims of corrective justice, that is, to whom we owe duties of corrective justice (i.e. ecosystems, species, individual non-human animals, or rather, groups of non-human animals). Finally, I raise concern about the difficulty of determining a baseline for the correction of wrongs to non-human animals that live in the wild, given that their original situation is far from idyllic. This has important implications deciding how to correct wrongs like those of climate change.

Jeff Sebo: “Justice in the Anthropocene”

Many political philosophers believe that we should aspire to just co-existence only if certain conditions are met, for example, only if we are roughly equal in power and live in conditions of moderate scarcity. However, the more we take seriously our entanglements across nations, generations, and species, the more we must accept that these conditions are not, in fact, met. This raises the question how to think about justice in the Anthropocene. I consider several answers: 1. We should aspire to just co-existence selectively. 2. We should change the world to fit our conception of justice. And, 3. We should change our conception of justice to fit the world. I then evaluate each answer, and I argue that the truth is somewhere in the middle. We should aspire to just co-existence with everyone, but we should also accept the need for compromise. We should change the world in some ways, but not other ways, to achieve this aim. And, we should change our conception of justice in some ways, but not other ways, to achieve this aim. I close by considering some concrete implications of this middle-ground view for nonhuman animals, and by making some general remarks about ideal theory, non-ideal theory, and transitional justice. Broadly speaking, I will advocate for pursuing as multi-species a political system as we can achieve, with concessions to anthropocentrism along the way.

Chris Armstrong: “The Rights of Marine Animals”

My presentation will draw on a book I am currently writing on the topic of ocean justice. The book mainly focuses on some rather applied questions about important reforms to the ocean economy, and on ways in which we can fairly respond to various challenges to the ocean environment. But in one of the later chapters, I address the rights of marine animals in particular. I argue that animals can be subjects of justice - that they possess certain entitlements which appear likely to generate enforceable duties of justice for humans. While I can't give a full account of the rights of marine animals, I illustrate at least some of their practical implications by sketching a set of core rights for cetaceans, and assess what kinds of policies or reforms respecting those rights might demand, especially in a time of climate emergency.

Linda Keeling: “Animal Welfare and the UN Sustainable Development Goals”

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have a wide scope, but the role of our domesticated and wild animals, including fish, is hardly mentioned and their welfare is not mentioned at all. Is animal welfare (AW) affected by the SDGs and does the improvement of AW have a role in achieving the SDGs? Our aim was to systematically evaluate these questions.

The initial analyses were based on a series of discussions and individual scoring among 12 experts from environmental, agricultural and veterinary sciences. The strengths of the links between improving AW and achieving each of the 17 SDGs (and vice versa) were then scored. The mean of the scores for each of the 17 SDGs was always positive, indicating that working to achieving the SDGs is compatible with working to improve AW and that overall there is a win-win scenario even if AW is never explicitly mentioned in the SDGs. However, the impact of achieving the SDGs on AW was considered to be slightly better (mean score=1.15) than the impact of improving AW on achieving the SDGs (mean score=0.89). The exception to this was SDG 2 (zero hunger), where the impact of improved AW on enabling the SDG was considered stronger than the effect of achieving the SDG on improving AW ($P < 0.05$, Wilcoxon). The two SDGs for which there was strongest mutual reinforcing were SDG 12, which deals with responsible production and consumption, and SDG 14, which deals with life below water.

Showing the relationships between animal welfare and the sustainable development goals helps highlight the importance of animal welfare when implementing these goals in practice. The methodology described in this study could also be useful to researchers working with other societal and environmental issues not yet considered within the overall SDG framework.

Simon Beard: (CSER) “Intrinsic Values of Nature”

Our report will focus on the intrinsic value of environmental systems and biodiversity. We begin by advancing two critiques of anthropocentric value systems: one based on the falsity of human nature dualism and the other based upon our inability to account for environmental complexity and the emergent properties of systems. We then explore the potential for ideas from non-western value systems such as Dharma (living in accordance with natural order in Sanskrit), 和 (Harmonization in Chinese) and Ubuntu (common humanity in many bantu languages) as well as concepts from ecofeminism and deep ecology to respond to these critiques. We do not adopt any of these philosophies wholesale, but rather use them as ways of identifying a richer approach to axiology that can include wider systemic effects and bridge dualistic divides. Our aim will be to defend three claims 1) that it makes sense to value ecological complexity and diversity intrinsically and separately to individual values. 2) that when we have to make tradeoffs between these values we should start from the understanding that they are qualitatively distinct, allowing only for rough comparability, and that our choice about what to value is as much a matter of value creation as value selection and 3) that in the current global condition we may be more likely to succeed in managing environmental risks if we focus more on the promotion of this value rather than reductive notions of animal and human welfare.

Paula Casal: “Sufficiency, Climate Change, and Animals”

I discuss two interpretations of the principle of sufficiency in the context of climate change. One of them protects the interests of future individuals of any species much more, and faces fewer practical and philosophical difficulties.

Jeff McMahan: “Animals and the Non-Identity Problem”

Climate change raises the Non-Identity Problem: if we cause the worst effects of climate change a century from now, the people who will suffer those effects will be people who would never have existed if we had not caused those effects. In this respect, climate change is relevantly like Parfit’s Depletion-Conservation case, which he assumes we can treat as a Same Number Case that comes within the scope of his *Same Number Quality Claim*, or *Q*: “If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” In a paper I published in 1998, I presented a challenge to *Q* – namely, that if I can either have a child or else breed my dog and have a puppy, but not both, *Q* implies that it would be wrong for me to breed my dog. This is because a dog would have a lower quality of life than a child. As I believe that the Non-Identity Problem compels us to explain the wrongness of causing climate change by reference to the fact that it involves causing less well off individuals to exist rather than better-off individuals, comparisons between the lives of persons and the lives of animals present a serious challenge. I propose to examine at least one response to this challenge, which is to revise *Q* in a way that restricts its scope in a way that avoids speciesism. I will discuss the suggestion that *Q*’s scope must be restricted in the same way that the scope of distributive principles such as those of equality and priority must be restricted. It is, for example, implausible to suppose that prioritarian principles imply that raising the well-being of fish has priority over raising that of badly off persons, since fish have lower levels of well-being than even badly off people do. Prioritarian and egalitarian principles may apply only within and not across categories of individuals with a comparable capacities for well-being (or comparable intrinsic potentials for having a certain capacity for well-being). Similarly, *Q* may have to be restricted so that it does not apply to comparisons between individuals, or groups of individuals, with radically different capacities (or intrinsic potentials) for well-being. I may also explore the application of the Non-Identity Problem to cases involving animals more generally. It seems that non-identity should matter less when identity itself matters less. And, if identity matters less when lives have less psychological unity, both synchronically and diachronically, then non-identity should matter less in cases involving animals (and of course some human beings as well).

Mark Budolfson: “Methods for Quantifying Animal Welfare, and Implications for Population Ethics”

We propose a framework for quantifying animal welfare for (individuals of) different species, putting the estimates of welfare impacts for different species all on the same scale as impacts to humans, and incorporating these methods into policy analysis. We present a crude example to illustrate such a method that has some empirical grounding, and show how it can be applied to modeling of optimal climate policy and other applications. Seeing how these methods would work also helps us see some more general theoretical implications of taking animal welfare seriously for population ethics, including new arguments against averaging and non-separable axiologies. (Based on a number of recent papers co-authored with Dean Spears)

Tatjana Visak: “How to (dis-) count effects on non-humans?”

Climate change affects humans as well as sentient non-humans and scientists expect that the effects may be negative for each group. Individuals are predicted to be worse off and die prematurely, due to extreme weather events, droughts, heat and other symptoms of climate change. This is widely agreed to give us *pro tanto* normative reasons for action, such as reasons to combat climate change and to minimize the resulting harm. Thus, according to a widely accepted line of argumentation, certain empirical facts lead to effects on welfare, which in turn provide us with normative reasons for action:

empirical facts → effects on welfare → normative reasons for action

In this talk I distinguish different ways of discounting effects on sentient non-humans or on other individuals or groups that are all based, in one way or the other, on the individual's or group's lower cognitive capacities. For example, it is claimed that sentient non-humans have a lower moral status, are not necessarily unfortunate in spite of being badly off, are not harmed as much as humans by death, or have a more limited capacity for realizing good than humans. The discounting of effects on non-humans may come in at different places. For example, it can come in (1) between effects on welfare and normative reasons for action, (2) between empirical facts and effects on welfare, or (2) within the concept of welfare itself. However, discounting effects (of climate change) on sentient non-humans (or on other individuals or groups) on the basis of their lower cognitive capacities need not take place at any of these places. This paper provides an overview of different attempts at discounting and of what it takes to resist them.

Oscar Horta: “Wild animal suffering: what it is, why it matters, and how to effectively reduce it”

This talk will first present a cumulative case for intervening to (1) help wild animals in need of aid and (2) prevent the suffering and other harms they undergo. It will argue that in order to best achieve these aims, the creation of a new cross-disciplinary field of study, which has been named “welfare biology”, appears to be crucial. While it challenges the prevailing normative (and to some extent methodological) paradigms in life sciences, it can be promoted by addressing some ways of studying and improving the wellbeing of wild animals that are likely to both be interesting to scientists and to receive public support. It then presents two recent studies (one using qualitative interviews and another consisting of a survey) carried out by the organization Animal Ethics. The purpose of these studies was to assess the attitudes of life scientists towards different forms of helping wild animals. The results indicate that areas likely to be supported in academia are wild animal vaccination, helping wild animals in urban and suburban environments, and rescuing animals affected by climate events. This potential to receive support, among other reasons that will be explained, makes them promising starting points. Another form of intervention, relevant to climate change and with a much more significant impact, consists in attaining ecosystems with less net animal suffering via the conservation of big herbivores; their presence in an ecosystem can prevent the existence of large numbers of small animals who, due to their reproductive strategies, are likely to have net-negative levels of wellbeing.

Tim Campbell: “Climate Change, Animal Welfare, and Insect Farming”

Insects of several different species, including grasshoppers and black soldier flies, are currently farmed as a protein source. Recently there has been some discussion of the possibility of expanding and scaling insect farming operations. With respect to mitigating climate change, insect farming offers some potential advantages over both factory farming and traditional rural farming. The potential advantages include considerable reductions in food waste, resource depletion, and total greenhouse gas emissions. But what about the insects themselves? From a welfarist perspective, there are at least two relevant considerations—the welfare level of a farmed insect and the aggregate value of insect populations (which, I will assume, is a function of the welfare levels of the individuals in the population). I consider three different views about the welfare of a farmed insect: (1) a farmed insect has a life worth living, albeit just barely (a very small amount of goodness); (2) a farmed insect has a life worth *not* living, albeit just barely (a very small amount of badness) and (3) a farmed insect has a neutral life (neither worth living nor worth not living). Next, I consider different ways of aggregating the value and disvalue of insect lives. Three views are considered: (4) the value of a population of farmed insects is an additive (separable) function of the values of the lives of its members, (5) good insect lives have diminishing marginal value and bad insect lives have diminishing marginal disvalue, and (6) good insect lives have diminishing marginal value, but bad insect lives do not. I consider the normative implications of different combinations of (1)—(3) with (4)—(6), and I compare the ethical advantages and

disadvantages of each combination with both traditional rural farming and factory farming. While some combinations (the most plausible ones, by my estimation) are ethically superior to both traditional rural farming and factory farming, other combinations may well be ethically inferior to both practices. Given our current level of uncertainty about each of (1)—(6), insect farming offers huge potential benefits, but also involves large ethical risks.